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According to Amie Thomasson's Modal Normativism (MN), knowledge of metaphysical modality is to be explained 
in terms of a speaker’s mastery of semantic rules, as opposed to one’s epistemic grasp of independent modal facts. In 
this chapter, I outline (MN)'s account of modal knowledge (§1) and argue that more than semantic mastery is needed 
for knowledge of metaphysical modality. Specifically (§2), in reasoning aimed at gaining such knowledge, a 
competent speaker needs to further deploy essentialist principles and information. In response, normativists might 
contend that a competent speaker will only need to appeal to specific independence counterfactuals, on analogy with 
quasi-realism about morality. These conditionals fix the meaning of our terms at the actual world, independently of 
the particular context in which a statement is evaluated. However, I show that this strategy causes several problems 
for the account (§3). While those problems might perhaps be avoided by endorsing a certain picture of modal 
metaphysics (Modal Monism), such a picture involves notorious issues that normativists will have to address (§4). It 
is thus doubtful that (MN) can explain knowledge of metaphysical modality. Still, it may explain some modal 
knowledge without committing to Modal Monism. As I show (§5), semantic mastery may suffice for gaining 
knowledge of logical-conceptual modality or analyticity. 
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Amie Thomasson (2007, 2018, 2020) has put forward an ambitious account of metaphysical 
modality, which she calls Modal Normativism—henceforth (MN). According to (MN), the 
function of metaphysical modal discourse isn’t to describe modal facts or properties in the world 
(or in other possible worlds). Instead, in thinking and talking about what is metaphysically possible 
and necessary, what we are doing is expressing, applying, and renegotiating semantic rules. As a 
consequence, knowledge of metaphysical modality is to be explained in terms of our understanding 
and use of semantic rules—i.e., semantic mastery—rather than our epistemic grasp of some 
independent modal reality. 
 
Here is an outline of the chapter. In §1, I present Thomasson’s (MN). In §2, I aim to show, against 
(MN), that semantic mastery is not sufficient for gaining knowledge of metaphysical modality. For 
a competent subject could always wonder whether something is metaphysically possible (or 
necessary) only based on her mastery of the semantic rules (and possibly empirical information). 




subject further needs to rely on essentialist principles and information. In response (§3), modal 
normativists might deny that any such “extra” principle and information is needed for knowledge 
of metaphysical modality. Instead, on analogy with quasi-realism about morality, they might argue 
that a competent speaker will only need to appeal to specific independence counterfactuals. Those 
conditionals fix the meaning of our terms at the actual world, independently of the particular 
context in which a statement is evaluated. If such conditionals hold, a subject who masters the 
rules couldn’t rationally wonder whether something is metaphysically possible (or necessary) 
while still counting as competent. However, in §3, I show that this strategy is problematic for (MN) 
in that it appeals to metasemantic principles that go beyond one’s semantic competence. 
Additionally, the strategy raises a worry of vicious circularity and seems potentially question-
begging. In §4, I explore a possible reply by modal normativists, which rests on identifying logical-
conceptual modality with metaphysical modality at the level of worlds—a thesis known as “Modal 
Monism”. But Modal Monism involves notorious problems, which the normativist will have to 
address. Lacking convincing reasons to think that Modal Monism is true, it is doubtful that 
semantic mastery alone (or aided by empirical information) can yield knowledge of metaphysical 
modality. Still, (MN) can account for some modal knowledge without committing to Modal 
Monism. As I show in §5, semantic mastery may suffice for gaining knowledge of logical-
conceptual necessity or analyticity. I introduce Timothy Williamson’s challenge to knowledge of 
analyticity (2007) and argue that normativists can successfully address it by adopting Paul 
Boghossian’s recent reply (2020). 
 
 
1. What is Modal Normativism?  
Thomasson aims to explain knowledge of metaphysical modality, since this is the modality that 
is at stake within central debates in philosophy. While she doesn’t explicitly characterize 
metaphysical modality or what counts as a metaphysical necessity or possibility, she offers a 
number of examples of metaphysical necessities (and derivatively, possibilities). Those include 
not just a priori analytic truths such as ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’, but also 
traditional Kripkean a posteriori necessities, e.g. ‘Necessarily seals are mammals’, including de 
re ones, e.g. ‘Water is necessarily H2O’ (see esp. 2020: Ch. 4). 
 
Thomasson frames modal normativism as a main alternative to traditional descriptivism, according 
to which modal discourse is aimed at tracking or describing certain features of our world (or of 
other possible worlds), namely modal facts and properties that exist independently of us. For 
Thomasson, descriptivism is false. She argues that metaphysical modal discourse is distinctively 
normative, in that it “serves the function of expressing, teaching, conveying, or (re-)negotiating 
semantic rules (or their consequences) in particularly advantageous ways” (2018: 11. Also 2020: 
64). Semantic rules include “application conditions”, which concern the conditions under which a 




a name or sortal term may be applied again to one and the same entity (2007: 140).1 On (MN), 
claims of metaphysical possibility and necessity should thus be understood as simply expressing 
our semantic rules, as opposed to tracking independent modal truth-makers. Take for example 
 
(B) Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried males 
 
The descriptivist says that (B) describes the necessary fact about bachelors that they are unmarried 
males, or that bachelors (qua the kind, not the individuals independently of the kind) necessarily 
possess the properties of being males and unmarried. Such properties or facts make (B) true. By 
contrast, according to Thomasson, (B) is to be explained in terms of the rules for correctly applying 
the term ‘bachelor’; particularly, the (metalinguistic) rule: ‘Apply 'bachelor' only where 
‘unmarried male’ applies’. By contrast with the metalinguistic rule, (B) explicitly states a 
necessity. 
 
Still, giving an account of metaphysical modality in terms of semantic rules apparently doesn’t 
prevent the normativist from talking of modal truths, facts, and properties. One will only need a 
few more steps to get to those from the relevant linguistic expressions. From (B), one can infer 
‘<Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried> is true’ by applying the equivalence schema ‘<p> is 
true IFF p’. Furthermore, Thomasson holds that from true modal claims we can “trivially infer” 
that modal facts and properties exist. For example, (B) implies ‘It is a fact that it is necessary that 
all bachelors are unmarried males’. And from a de re modal claim such as ‘Water is necessarily 
H2O’ one may trivially infer ‘Water has the modal property of being necessarily H2O”. 
 
Thomasson’s thesis is that once (MN) is in place we can explain knowledge of metaphysical 
modality in terms of semantic mastery.2 More precisely, on (MN) the ability to use our terms 
appropriately is tantamount to tacit modal knowledge. For being able to correctly apply the 
semantic rules governing our terms shows that one at least implicitly knows what the rules require 
and allow; namely, as we might put it, what must be (necessity) and might be (possibility) in cases 
that fall under the scope of the relevant rules. On the other hand, speakers will have explicit modal 
knowledge when they “gain an explicit understanding of the rules” (2018: 15), which enables them 
in turn to articulate and communicate the rules. This goes beyond one’s ability to correctly apply 
or refuse to apply our terms in relevant contexts. What is required for explicit modal knowledge is 
that a speaker can explicitly express the semantic rules themselves in the object language. In 
Thomasson’s words, explicit modal knowledge is the ability to  
 
 
1 Note that (MN)’s vocabulary seems neutral between the level of language and the level of thought. Its main tenets 
are cashed out in terms of semantic rules, concepts, and mastery, as well as linguistic rules and linguistic 
competence. Accordingly, my terminology is also meant to be neutral between the two levels. 




mov[e] from mastering the rules for properly applying and refusing expressions (as 
a competent speaker), to being able to explicitly convey these rules (and what 
follows from them) in the object language and indicative mood. (2018: 15) 
 
Importantly, empirical information will sometimes contribute to the acquisition of modal 
knowledge, in addition to one’s conceptual mastery. On (MN), knowledge of empirical facts and 
empirical discoveries often contribute to knowing derivative modal facts. Consider for example, 
 
(W) Whatever microstructure the baptized sample has, water necessarily has that 
microstructure 
 
For Thomasson, (W) is a “conceptual truth that we can know via conceptual analysis” (a priori). 
On the other hand, the fact that water necessarily has microstructure H2O is a derivative modal 
fact that one may come to know via empirical investigation (2018: 16. Also 2020: 163-64). 
 
 
2  Semantic Mastery vs. Metaphysical Modal Knowledge 
Here is my main worry. Does (MN) succeed in explaining knowledge of metaphysical modality? 
Can one’s mastery of semantic rules (possibly together with empirical information) yield 
knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity?3  
 
A natural concern that one might have is that coming to know metaphysical modal truths requires 
investigating philosophical issues that seem to go beyond matters of semantic competence and 
linguistic practice. For instance, issues involving the nature of things or their essence, what sorts 
of grounding relationships things are involved in, the modal status of the laws of nature, and so 
on. How can knowledge of such issues solely derive from semantic mastery (and possibly 
empirical information)? Semantic mastery allows speakers to use words correctly. It may well 
enable them to formulate complex modal questions with great precision; but arguably it doesn’t 
per se put one in a position to answer such questions. 
 
Consider an example. Patty is a chemist who works on water quality around the world.  She has 
mastered the application and co-application conditions for the term ‘water’ as well as the relevant 
empirical information about actual water, while also being a rigorous reasoner. Could Patty 
rationally wonder whether water is necessarily H2O, or whether, say, it could have contained 
carbon instead?  
 
Modal normativists would say no. Remember principle (W): 
 
3 A further problem that I won’t pursue here is that requiring that one explicitly expresses the rules in order to gain 
modal knowledge seems to imply that there must be fixed rules for all cases. However, Wittgenstein's commentary 
on rule-following gives reason to think that this is wrong. Some concepts may not have fixed rules all the way out, 





(W) Whatever microstructure the baptized sample has, water necessarily has that 
microstructure 
 
According to (MN), Patty should know (W) solely from mastering the rules for the ingredient term, 
a priori. Then, by combining principle (W) with the other semantic rules as well as with what she 
empirically knows about water, she should be able to conclude that water couldn’t have contained 
carbon. Water is necessarily H2O.  
 
One main difficulty with this approach is that it isn’t clear what exactly in the semantic rules for 
‘microstructure’, ‘baptized sample’, and ‘water’ would justify conclusions concerning the 
metaphysical necessity of a substance’s microstructure. It isn’t clear, in particular, what would 
compel a thinker to connect the rules for using those terms in such a way that she would infer 
principle (W). Which rule or combination of rules would Patty have to master in order to come to 
draw such a metaphysical conclusion? That’s hard to say. But, without principle (W) and by only 
appealing to the rules for using ‘water’ and ‘H2O’, Patty couldn’t rule out the possibility that water 
might have contained carbon if the actual world had been different. She could wonder whether 
water is necessarily H2O without counting as irrational, incompetent, or poorly informed for doing 
so. For such a scenario seems consistent with what the rules for using those terms strictly dictate. 
 
I think that in order for Patty to come to know (W), she would need to rely on certain further 
assumptions. Specifically, she needs to deploy a general essentialist bridge-principle: 
 
(E) If it is essential to x being F that it is G, then necessarily anything that is F is G 
 
together with the information that  
 
(C) Having chemical composition C is essential to being a certain kind of substance s 
 
(E) and (C) are the additional premises that together would allow a competent speaker like Patty 
to rationally derive (W) from her semantic base. But these sorts of metaphysical principles seem 
also hardly reducible to the semantic rules for the correct application of our terms. How would 
Patty retrieve (E) and (C) from her semantic repertoire? In this case, too, it isn’t clear how the rules 
for using the ingredient terms would dictate (given adequate translations) principles (E) and (C). 
It seems indeed consistent with those rules that the principles are false. 
 
On the other hand, without the contribution of (E) and (C), it would seem that (W) was simply 
introduced in the language “by hand” or arbitrarily: for nothing in the rules for correctly using 
‘microstructure’, ‘baptized sample’, and ‘water’ appears to indicate that a substance necessarily 





Note further that empirical information won’t help fill the gap here between semantic knowledge 
and metaphysical modal knowledge, no matter how accurate that information is. Empirical 
information concerns how things actually are on Earth, but says nothing about other possible 
worlds—especially worlds where the laws of nature are quite different from our own.  
 
But if Patty can’t infer (E), (C), or (W) solely from her mastery of the ingredient terms, that means 
that solely based on her semantic competence she could legitimately wonder whether water is 
necessarily H2O, or whether it could have contained carbon instead. Indeed, if she only relied on 
her mastery of semantic rules, she would likely have many other queries concerning metaphysical 
modality. She might wonder whether it is in virtue of the nature or essence of water that it cannot 
contain carbon. She might wonder whether the fact that something is a sample of water is grounded 
in its being H2O. She might consider some distant possible world where the laws of nature are very 
different from our own: could there have been water in such a world, or perhaps something in its 
core properties is tied to the actual chemical and physical laws in such an intimate way that makes 
that scenario metaphysically impossible? Which semantic rules in Patty’s repertoire could answer 
such questions? Again it’s hard to say. The rules seem simply silent about these issues. 
 
Crucially, as mentioned, we wouldn’t take Patty’s queries as an indication of some flaw in her 
semantic competence, relevant empirical knowledge, or reasoning. We’d still regard her as a 
perfectly competent speaker of English, who’s also very knowledgeable about chemistry, and who 
reasonably wonders about such difficult issues. However, on (MN), we would be forced to 
conclude that Patty isn’t a competent speaker of English or a good chemist after all. Or even that 
she’s irrational.4  
 
Perhaps the modal normativist might cook up some principles analogous to (W) containing the 
terms ‘essence’, ‘grounding’, ‘natural laws’ etc., which are devised to address each of those issues. 
But note that that won’t be much progress. For an analogous challenge to the one I raised in the 
case of (W) arises; namely to show how the purported principles could themselves be derived 
solely from our semantic rules. 
 
 
3  Independence Conditionals for Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality 
I suggested that (MN) needs to integrate knowledge of essentialist or other metaphysical principles 
and information besides one’s conceptual mastery (and possibly empirical information) in order 
 
4 My argument here is reminiscent of Moore’s Open Question argument. Patty’s rational wondering shows that more 
than conceptual mastery is needed for metaphysical modal knowledge. Analogously, Boghossian has recently 
argued against the thesis that knowledge of normative truths can be explained by understanding alone, by pointing 
out that a competent thinker can always doubt whether e.g. some candidate substantive characterization of a bad act-
type is what actually plays the role indicated by an obvious definition of ‘wrong’. That shows that more than 
conceptual mastery is needed for substantive moral knowledge. Notably, Boghossian’s argument reaches the same 
conclusion as Moore’s Open Question argument, but through a different route (See Boghossian and Williamson 




to explain knowledge of metaphysical modality. The modal normativist might reply that the 
objection begs the question in favor of certain “heavy-weight” descriptivist metaphysics and 
against modal normativism.  For the objection claims that notions such as essence or the nature of 
things, grounding, etc. escape the kind of semantic reduction (MN) proposes. But those notions 
might themselves have a plausible treatment on the normativist view. 
 
However, modal normativists might also reply that they don't need to resort to any such notions at 
all. There is a different strategy to ensure that a rational, competent, and well-informed speaker 
won’t have doubts concerning metaphysical modal matters such as whether water is necessarily 
H2O. The strategy consists in addressing objections like the one involving chemist Patty in the 
same way as normativists address the traditional objection against conventionalism.  
 
The objection against conventionalism denies that we can know metaphysical modal truths by 
extrapolating them from our semantic competence, since our linguistic conventions might have 
been different.5 But normativists stress that on their view modality isn’t contingent on the 
particular linguistic conventions we happened to adopt. On the contrary, they claim that they are 
entitled to accept specific independence counterfactuals, on analogy with quasi-realism about 
morality. Like quasi-realists, modal normativists also  
 
[...] accept that these moral/modal facts are—in a relevant and important sense—mind-
independent. For both accept certain independence conditionals. The moral quasi-realist 
accepts, for example, that it would still be wrong to kick dogs for fun, even if it were the 
case that I (and others) approved of it. (2018: 20) 
 
Analogously in the case of (MN),  
 
The modal normativist can tell a parallel story, entitling her to accept independence 
conditionals—accepting, for example, that it is necessary that seals are mammals, and that 
this would still be the case even in worlds in which there were no speakers or thinkers (and 
so in which we don’t use the relevant terms) at all. (ivi) 
 
The independence conditionals specify that certain truths hold independently of contingencies 
about how we use language and the semantic rules we have adopted. They fix the meaning of our 
terms at the actual world, independently of the particular context in which a statement is evaluated. 
In this way, they secure that the modal statements we derive from our semantic rules effectively 
range over all metaphysically possible worlds. The general form of an independence counterfactual 
is the following: given that it is necessary that xs are F, then even if we didn’t use terms A and B 
 
5 The objection against conventionalism assumes that appealing to something contingent (i.e., a linguistic 
convention) to explain a metaphysical necessity fails because necessary truths are necessarily necessary, as per 
axiom S4 of modal logic. Although most philosophers hold that S4 is correct for metaphysical modality, some have 




to refer to xs and F respectively, it would still be necessary that xs are F. Accordingly, it would 
still be the case that ‘seals are mammals’ is true in (i) worlds where there are no speakers or 
thinkers, as well as (ii) worlds where people use the terms ‘seals’ and ‘mammals’ differently—
worlds, let’s say, where those words pick out lizards and birds respectively. 
 
This strategy should help the modal normativist explain how one could gain knowledge of 
metaphysical modality solely based on her semantic competence, since the conditionals entail that 
we should take our (actual) semantic rules to hold at all possible worlds. As Thomasson explains,  
 
When we evaluate a counterfactual conditional, we must evaluate its truth at another world, 
leaving its meaning fixed as the actual meaning at our world. For we want to know whether 
this same claim (“Necessarily, all seals are mammals”), with the same meaning, would be 
true at another world, in other circumstances or given other suppositions. (2020: 89) 
 
Going back to chemist Patty, based on the independence counterfactuals she should conclude 
without hesitation that water is necessarily H2O, likewise that it is necessary that seals are 
mammals (assuming she is also minimally knowledgeable in biology). Patty would know that 
(actual) semantic rules such as ‘Apply 'water' only where ‘H2O’ applies’, or ‘Apply 'seal' only 
where ‘mammal’ applies’ are meant to hold at all possible worlds. Thus, she couldn’t rationally 
wonder whether water is necessarily H2O or necessarily seals are mammals given her semantic 
competence and empirical background—which blocks our original objection.  
 
However, this reply raises several problems. Let us leave aside the issue of whether morality and 
modality are in fact relevantly similar, such that metaethical arguments can be successfully recast 
for the case of modality by simple analogy and go through as well.  
 
There are three additional main problems. First, endorsing the independence counterfactuals 
requires accepting a meta-rule concerning how our semantic rules work at all possible worlds. This 
indicates that the conditionals carry a primitive or unexplained modal element, which raises a 
worry of vicious circularity. Second, the need to integrate the independence conditionals shows, 
against (MN)’s main tenet, that conceptual competence alone isn’t strictly sufficient for knowing 
metaphysical modality. Third, it is not clear on what grounds one should accept such conditionals. 
On the contrary, the modal normativist doesn’t seem to have good reasons to endorse them. That 
such conditionals hold is something normativists assume, rather than defending, which raises the 
worry that the view begs the question in their favor. Let us discuss these issues in turn.  
 
 
3.1  The Threat of Circularity 
As we saw, modal normativists may invoke suitable independence conditionals to ensure that a 




possibility in all sorts of counterfactual scenarios. These conditionals secure that the meaning of 
our words won’t change in different contexts but will stay stable across all possible worlds. But 
then it appears that endorsing such conditionals entails in effect accepting a second-order rule 
concerning the scope of our own semantic rules. As I shall formulate it, the meta-rule establishes 
that  
 
(N) Actual semantic rules should be held fixed at all possible worlds, i.e. they should be 
taken to hold necessarily 
 
If this is correct, (MN)’s account of knowledge of metaphysical modality turns out to involve an 
implicit modal element. A competent speaker would have to have some prior grasp on what 
‘necessarily’ means in order to be able to apply the independence conditionals and reach the correct 
modal judgments. 
 
To further elaborate, the problem is that in order for a subject to accept the independence 
counterfactuals, she would need to know not just what our semantic rules are and how to express 
them explicitly. But also that the rules should be kept fixed at all possible worlds. Otherwise, how 
could she conclude that rules such as, ‘Apply 'water' only where ‘H2O’ applies’, or ‘Apply 'seal' 
only where ‘mammal’ applies’ are meant to regulate uses of ‘water’, and ‘seal’ at all possible 
worlds, not just in actual world contexts? Being able to formulate the independence counterfactuals 
thus requires applying meta-rule (N). But that means that some modal knowledge is presupposed 
by one’s correct application of the semantic rules, rather than being derived from the rules like 
(MN) holds. 
 
Thus, my first worry is that (MN)’s account of modal knowledge is threatened by vicious 
circularity. That a competent subject must have some prior knowledge of the concept of 
metaphysical necessity seems problematic, since on (MN) knowledge of metaphysical modality 
should be derived from the semantic rules, not presupposed by them. 
 
Perhaps modal normativists can find some way to accommodate this issue and avoid circularity. 
But note that explaining how a subject could have such a concept of metaphysical necessity is no 
trivial task. Surely, she will translate the semantic rules into the corresponding explicit modal 
statements: ‘Water is necessarily H2O’, and ‘Necessarily, seals are mammals’. But, as mentioned, 
she might naturally take ‘necessarily’ to simply regulate correct linguistic usage, and so to express 
what the semantic rules dictate for all contexts of use that might actually occur, i.e., in our world. 
After all, we don’t typically teach and learn a language by assessing whether our utterances would 
be true or false on Twin-Earth, or other sorts of possible worlds. In order for a subject to gain 
metaphysical modal knowledge from semantic mastery, she’ll further need to understand 
‘necessarily’ not simply as a ‘must’ regulating correct linguistic usage, but rather as the ‘must’ of 




what’ or, in the usual terminology, ‘at all possible worlds’. Understanding correctly the modal 
force of the statements translating the semantic rules is essential for gaining knowledge of 
metaphysical modality like (MN) holds. But that is substantive modal knowledge—knowledge 
regarding what metaphysical necessity captures—which is presupposed by the account not 
explained by it.  
 
Lacking some grasp of the second-order rule (N), it would be rational for Patty to wonder whether 
water is necessarily H2O, or could have contained carbon; or whether seals are necessarily 
mammals, or could have been birds. And so on.  
 
Thus, modal normativists should address the following problem. Knowing the meta-rule that 
governs the modal behavior of semantic rules is required for knowing about metaphysical necessity 
and possibility; but knowing the rule itself involves prior modal knowledge.  
 
3.2  Meta-rules Governing Semantic Rules 
Let us assume that modal normativists can manage the circularity problem. Still, appealing to one’s 
second-order knowledge of the independence counterfactuals shows, against (MN)’s main thesis, 
that semantic competence (and possibly empirical information) isn’t strictly sufficient for 
knowledge of metaphysical modality. In addition, a subject would need to know meta-rule (N) 
governing our semantic rules, or otherwise grasp it, in order to formulate suitable independence 
counterfactuals and thereby reach the correct metaphysical modal judgments.  
 
Importantly, rule (N) isn’t itself something one can derive from one’s concepts, since it is a rule 
concerning how to properly apply our semantic rules. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem that (N) could 
be discovered empirically, either. What kind of empirical evidence could one possibly gather in 
support of a rule that establishes the validity of our semantic rules at all possible worlds?  
 
So, the modal normativist should explain how to accommodate the need for such metasemantic 
knowledge within an account that purports to explain knowledge of metaphysical modality solely 
in terms of mastery of our semantic rules (and possibly empirical information).  
 
3.3.  The Justification of the Independence Conditionals 
A final problem for (MN) that derives from introducing the independence counterfactuals is that 
it is not clear on what grounds one should accept such conditionals. While Thomasson stresses that 
“indeed it is crucial that the modal normativist be able to accept this kind of independence 
counterfactuals” as well as that she “can justifiedly accept independence conditionals to the effect 
that metaphysical modal truths aren’t contingent on our adoption of certain linguistic rules” (2018: 
20), we are not told on what grounds modal normativists have such an ability and what their 





We saw that the conditionals themselves rest on a meta-rule, (N), which states that our semantic 
rules should be taken to hold at all possible worlds or necessarily. But that only pushes the question 
back to what in turn justifies (N). Why are we entitled to reason on the assumption that our rules 
won’t change across possible worlds? 
 
Indeed, within the normativist framework it might seem false that the independence conditionals 
hold. Suppose that the actual world never contained any speakers or thinkers. Contrary to what 
(MN) claims, it would follow that, say, ‘seals’ and ‘mammals’ were never terms that came about 
to refer to seals and mammals, since there wouldn’t have been any language or thoughts to start 
with. How could it still be true on (MN)’s account that ‘Necessarily, seals are mammals’?  
 
Note that the descriptivist has a significant advantage here. While she is happy to endorse the 
independence counterfactuals, she doesn’t have a problem acknowledging the existence of modal 
facts and properties that are independent of any conceptualization and linguistic expression, and 
that support such conditionals. She can indeed justify endorsing the conditionals in a 
straightforward way, by simply appealing to what being a certain (kind of) thing is: it is just part 
of the nature or essence of seals that they are mammals, likewise it’s part of the nature or essence 
of water that it is H2O. That guarantees that ‘Necessarily, seals are mammals’ is true not just at 
worlds where individuals use those terms differently; but even assuming there never had been any 
individuals to start with. On this view, modal facts and properties have nothing to do with the rules 
for using our terms, beyond the simple fact that our terms are inter alia aimed to correctly track 
and express such facts and properties. 
 
As we know, modal normativists explicitly reject descriptivism. So they owe us an explanation as 
to what justifies endorsing the independence conditionals. If, on the other hand, those conditionals 
are simply assumed to hold, that seems just arbitrary. The worry is that (MN) would be begging 
the question in its favor. Although the theory should demonstrate that the modal normativist can 
legitimately integrate such conditionals for reaching correct judgments about metaphysical 
modality, it rather presupposes that this is the case.  
 
 
4.  A Possible Way-Out: Modal Monism  
I have argued that semantic competence is not sufficient for knowledge of metaphysical 
modality. In particular, essentialist principles and information should be integrated in a 
successful account of how we know about metaphysical necessity and possibility. On the other 
hand, attempting to solve the problem by appealing to independence conditionals that fix the 
meaning of our terms at the actual world generates a host of other problems. It raises a worry of 
vicious circularity; it shows that semantic competence isn’t strictly sufficient for knowledge of 






However, the modal normativist might contend that those criticisms miss the point of the 
normativist account. She might insist that one doesn’t need any “extra” essentialist or other 
metaphysical knowledge on top of one’s conceptual competence in order to reach correct 
judgments of metaphysical modality. Likewise, one doesn't need to integrate any second-order 
knowledge or meta-rules. Instead, one could formulate the relevant independence conditionals by 
simply mastering the rules themselves. It should be part of one’s ability to master the rules that 
‘Necessarily, all seals are mammals’ derives from rules that should be taken to hold at all possible 
worlds, i.e. necessarily. Perhaps all there is to metaphysical necessity is fully captured by the 
explicit modal translation of the semantic rules.  
 
Put otherwise, the modal normativist might deny that there is a distinctive concept of metaphysical 
necessity, which is different in particular from logical-conceptual necessity. This is a familiar 
distinction in the modal metaphysics literature. Metaphysical modality concerns possibilities and 
necessities that roughly depend on the nature or identity of things and the laws of metaphysics 
(i.e., essentialist principles, relations of grounding, ontological dependence and laws of mereology, 
and so on). Logical-conceptual modality, on the other hand, concerns the possibilities and 
necessities that depend on the meaning of our terms or the rules for applying our concepts, while 
also respecting the laws of logic and the truth-preserving patterns of inference. Based on this 
distinction, we could recast our interpretation of (MN) in the following way. The object-language 
translations of the semantic rules strictly express matters of logical-conceptual necessity; whereas, 
the meta-rule underlying the independence conditionals ensures that those statements are also 
metaphysically necessary. But modal normativists might deny that there is a genuine distinction 
between logical-conceptual vs. metaphysical modality. They might instead side with those 
philosophers who hold that at the level of worlds or propositions the two modalities coincide—a 
thesis that’s called “Modal Monism” (Chalmers 2010: ch. 6; Kment 2017). By identifying logical-
conceptual modality and metaphysical modality in this way, monists deny that there are two 
different and irreducible kinds of modality or sources of necessity.  
 
So, how do they deal with the usual modal distinctions? On the one hand, it is widely 
acknowledged that propositions may be logically-conceptually possible though not metaphysically 
possible. For example, it is logically-conceptually possible that water isn’t H2O (that doesn’t imply 
a contradiction), although it is metaphysically impossible. On the other hand, logical-conceptual 
necessities might not be metaphysically necessary. To illustrate, we could slightly adapt Gareth 
Evans’ “Julius” case (1979). If the name ‘Julius’ refers rigidly to the person who is in fact the 
inventor of the zip, then ‘Julius (if he exists) invented the zip’ is logically-conceptually necessary. 
But it’s also metaphysically contingent, since Julius could have become a car dealer, say, rather 





To account for those data, Monists introduce a distinction at the level of meaning or content: 
sentences may have different associated descriptions or express two different propositions having 
different modal status, necessary vs. contingent. That’s the core thesis of two-dimensional 
semantics. For example, in David Chalmers’ two-dimensional framework (2010), ‘Water is H2O’ 
is secondarily necessary but primarily contingent; whereas, ‘Julius (if he exists) invented the zip’ 
is primarily necessary but secondarily contingent. Monists hold that all the data can be explained 
by a single notion of modality coupled with semantic distinctions. At the level of modal 
metaphysics, they maintain that logical-conceptual possibilities (and necessities) are also 
metaphysical possibilities (and necessities). (See e.g. Chalmers 2010: ch. 6). 
 
If Modal Monism is true, no extra component besides conceptual mastery and rigorous reasoning 
(and sometimes empirical information) is needed for gaining knowledge of metaphysical modality. 
If we can gain knowledge of logical-conceptual necessity from opportunely translating the rules, 
we eo ipso gain knowledge of metaphysical necessity—which is (MN)’s desired outcome. 
 
But accepting Modal Monism comes with its own costs. I shall mention two main issues Monists 
must face. First, while Monism simplifies the modal metaphysics, it requires that we endorse a 
complex semantic theory, i.e., two-dimensionalism, which many find highly controversial. (For 
example, it is doubtful that two-dimensionalism can provide a plausible analysis of names and 
natural kind terms. For discussion: Schroeter 2021). Additionally, accepting Monism typically 
involves endorsing the view that what a possible world could look like is a matter of the descriptive 
content of our expressions. But language can hardly be the general source of the modal status of 
propositions, as Kripke’s cases of the necessary a posteriori have long shown. (For discussion: 
Chalmers 2010: ch.6; Soames 2002; Vaidya 2008; Mallozzi 2018). 
 
Modal Monism might offer some insight into the modal metaphysics underlying (MN)’s account 
of knowledge of metaphysical modality. So, the modal normativist might want to clarify if she is 
in fact committed to such a view. If that’s the case, however, she would have to further explain 
how the account addresses Modal Monism’s notorious problems.  
 
 
5. Modal Normativism and Knowledge of Analyticity 
In this final section I aim to show how (MN) might still explain some modal knowledge, without 
committing to Modal Monism. Suppose Modal Dualism is true (i.e., roughly the thesis that there 
is a genuine distinction between logical-conceptual vs. metaphysical modality). Modal 
normativists can at least explain how semantic mastery alone may suffice to gain knowledge of 
logical-conceptual modality. For on this view translating the semantic rules into the object 
language will strictly express matters of logical-conceptual necessity, and so a competent, rational 





Let us define the analytic truths as those sentences that may be known to be true solely through 
grasp of their meaning (this is what Boghossian 1996 calls “epistemic analyticity”)6. Knowledge 
of logical-conceptual necessity might then be taken to coincide with knowledge of analyticity thus 
defined. 
 
The thesis that semantic competence is sufficient for knowledge of analyticity might perhaps strike 
one as trivial. It’s not. Indeed, knowledge of analyticity has been extensively criticized by 
Williamson (2007: ch. 4). In what follows, I outline Williamson’s challenge against knowledge of 
analyticity and how it might affect (MN). While Thomasson’s own reply to Williamson (2015: 
7.3) stresses the differences between their respective views and appeals to normative notions that 
the opponent might find unsatisfying, I show that (MN) can still successfully answer Williamson’s 
challenge on his own (descriptive) terms, as originally formulated. I do so by adapting 
Boghossian’s recent reply to Williamson (Boghossian and Williamson 2020). I conclude that (MN) 
can still explain knowledge of analyticity or logical-conceptual modality. 
 
As Williamson characterizes it, epistemological analyticity is such that one’s understanding of a 
sentence guarantees that one assents to the sentence (2007: 73). For example, ‘Every vixen is a 
female fox’, is an analytic sentence in this sense since necessarily, whoever understands it assents 
to it. On the other hand, failure to assent to sentence s shows that one doesn’t understand s.  
 
Against epistemological analyticity, Williamson has raised the problem of “Competent Dissent” 
(as Boghossian labeled it). Williamson argues that a fully competent native speaker of English 
might not assent to an elementary logical truth such as ‘Every vixen is a vixen’, while still 
understanding it. There might be various reasons for this. One might have somehow developed the 
conviction that vixens do not exist, while also holding that universal quantification is existentially 
committing. Or one might believe that there are borderline cases, such that it is neither true nor 
false that ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ (2007: 86-88). Indeed, the subjects in Williamson’s Competent 
Dissent scenarios are often experts in relevant fields—such as in the case of the distinguished 
logician Vann McGee, who has famously argued against modus ponens, thus refusing to assent to 
modus ponens while certainly understanding it (92). A further example involves philosophical 
expertise. Take for example sentence (KB): ‘It is necessary that whoever knows p believes p’. 
 
6 For Boghossian, an analytic sentence may be known to be true solely through grasp of its meaning, “provided that 
grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth” (1996: 363). As he explains, epistemic analyticity 
should be sharply distinguished from traditional metaphysical analyticity, according to which an analytic sentence is 
true purely by virtue of its meaning. Quine’s criticism of analyticity (targeting more precisely those truths that can 
be converted into logical truths by substitution of synonyms for synonyms, or “Frege-analyticity”, 366) should be 
understood for Boghossian as undermining the metaphysical notion, whereas the epistemological notion can be 
preserved. Note that there are additional conceptions of analyticity. In Kant’s original definition, an analytic truth is 
one in which the predicate is already (covertly) contained in the subject (e.g., in the case of ‘All bachelors are 
unmarried’ the predicate ‘unmarried’ makes explicit what was already contained in the subject ‘bachelor’). Yet 
another notion—I shall call it “essentialist analyticity”—takes analytic truths to hold in virtue of the identity or 
essence of the concepts (Fine 2005). Whether there might be additional notions, and whether they may all be 




Williamson remarks that “many philosophers, [and] native speakers of English, have denied [KB]. 
They are not usually or plausibly accused of failing to understand the words ‘know’ or ‘believe’” 
(168).  Additionally—we will see the significance of this point shortly—according to Williamson 
the subjects in question might not just refuse to assent to a certain sentence s, but even lose the 
disposition to assent to s while allegedly retaining full understanding of s. Williamson draws a 
provoking general conclusion to the question of “what is epistemically available simply on the 
basis of linguistic and conceptual competence. To a first approximation, the answer is: nothing” 
(77).  
 
According to (MN), a subject may come to know modal truths solely based on her ability to 
correctly use and convey the semantic rules for our terms and what follows from them. Assuming, 
as it is plausible, that being able to use and express the semantic rules entails grasping their 
meaning, then the modal truths we may come to know on (MN) are (epistemic) analytic truths. 
 
But then (MN)’s account of modal knowledge (qua restricted to logical-conceptual necessity or 
analyticity) is also open to Williamson’s Competent Dissent problem. Assuming that 
understanding a sentence is a matter of normal semantic competence, possessing the relevant 
competence is all that is required for assenting to an analytic sentence. (MN) is concerned with 
knowledge not assent, as we have seen. But since knowledge is a stronger notion than assent, 
(MN)’s account should entail that mastering our semantic rules suffices for assenting to analytic 
truths. So for example, on (MN) someone who masters the semantic rules for ‘vixen’ (and the 
other ingredient terms), should assent to analytic truth (or logical-conceptual necessity): 
 
 (V) Necessarily, all vixens are female foxes 
 
In a Williamsonian spirit, one could argue that a competent speaker might not assent to (V), while 
mastering the rules for the ingredient terms and thus perfectly understanding (V).  
 
Thomasson is aware of the challenge and maintains that modal normativists can easily avoid it. 
What they need isn’t the (descriptive) claim that semantic competence entails a disposition to 
assent; but rather the (normative) claim that semantic competence entails that one ought to assent 
to the relevant sentences and can be rebuked if one refuses. Semantic competence entitles one to 
the relevant conclusions (2015: 238-239). Additionally, a competent subject who deviates from 
the normal practice might have revisionary goals: she might be aiming to renegotiate the relevant 
semantic rules (243).  
 
But Williamson will likely find this normativist strategy unsatisfying. As he put it elsewhere, “if 
one ought to reason in some way, should not something deeper explain why one ought to reason 
in that way?” (2003: 291) What’s missing from the normativist story is an explanation of the 




normativist can integrate her account with that kind of justification, Williamson’s original 
challenge is still open.  
 
Fortunately, there is a response to the Competent Dissent problem that preserves Williamson’s 
non-normative set up in terms of one’s (disposition to) assent, which can be fruitfully adopted by 
(MN). Boghossian (in Boghossian and Williamson 2020) points out that in certain cases assenting 
to a sentence s is in fact constitutive of one’s understanding s—for example, in the case of logical 
constants, or of traditional analytic truths. In such cases, one is justified in assenting to s based on 
understanding, according to Boghossian, because assenting plays such a constitutive role for 
understanding. Thereby, in cases where a competent subject refuses to assent to s, she will at least 
retain the disposition to assent to s if she does still understand s. Boghossian takes up the example 
of conjunction: 
 
A natural description of Williamson’s expert, who develops theoretical misgivings about 
[conjunction-elimination, CE] is that she retains the disposition to assent to instances of 
CE [e.g., ‘If Mary ate the apple and the pear, then Mary ate the apple’], but refuses to act 
on that disposition as a result of the sophisticated misgivings. As we may put it, she may 
continue to find CE primitively compelling, even as she now finds it derivatively 
uncompelling. (190) 
  
We saw that Williamson denies that competent speakers, indeed experts, need to retain even any 
disposition to assent. For him, they might well lose it altogether. However, Boghossian 
distinguishes two ways in which one might lose such a disposition and end up thinking that s is no 
longer plausible: (a) all things considered vs. (b) independently of any consideration. Williamson’s 
Competent Dissent scenarios are not really counterexamples to epistemological analyticity 
because they are instances of (a) not (b). So they strictly miss the target.  
 
To elaborate, in Williamson’s scenarios experts reach their dissident conclusions based on lots of 
theoretical considerations, namely all things considered (a). That means that they lose their 
disposition to assent to s not solely based on their linguistic competence (or “primitively”), but in 
virtue of further considerations stemming from their expertise (or “derivatively”). In order to have 
a genuine counterexample to epistemological analyticity, the speaker should lose her disposition 
independently of any contribution from further considerations (b), while somehow still retaining 
full understanding of s. But cases of the latter sort are quite implausible. As Boghossian points out, 
we might legitimately doubt that a subject who loses her disposition to assent to, say, conjunction-
elimination for no particular reason would still count as understanding ‘and’ (217). Boghossian’s 
reply can in effect be cast as a dilemma for Williamson. Once it is clear that a counterexample to 
epistemological analyticity should involve one’s losing her disposition to assent to s primitively 
or independently of any considerations, while also retaining her understanding of s, Williamson’s 




or (ii) are utterly implausible (because it is not clear that they satisfy the latter requirement that the 
subject still understands s). 
 
For similar reasons, I think that (MN)’s account of modal knowledge (again, as restricted to 
knowledge of analyticity or logical-conceptual necessity) is also safe from Williamson’s criticism. 
For speakers might well gain knowledge of analytic truths by rigorous reasoning solely based on 
their semantic competence. A competent speaker who loses her disposition to assent to (B) or (V) 
solely on that basis (or primitively), while still retaining normal reasoning capacities, no longer 
appears to understand those truths—somehow, she would have lost her mastery of the basic 
semantic rules for the ingredient terms.7 
 
In conclusion, although (MN)’s account of modal knowledge faces several problems as an account 
of knowledge of metaphysical modality, it may still successfully explain knowledge of logical-
conceptual modality or analyticity, while being safe from the sorts of criticisms raised by 
Williamson’s Competent Dissent problem.8  
  
 
7 The strategy should be welcomed by normativists, as Thomasson seems open to the possibility of treating basic 
norms regarding acceptance (and rejection) as “constitutive norms for thought” (2015: 240, fn. 8). 
8 Many thanks to Paul Boghossian, Theodore Locke, Amie Thomasson, and Anand Vaidya for helpful comments on 
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